China’s nuclear review: what it could change – and what it won’t

Observers of China's nuclear expansion are still waiting to see what the government's post-Fukushima review will mean for the future of nuclear energy in China. But nothing so far indicates that the review will slow the scale of development substantially - or alleviate the pressures this nuclear building boom will put on China's human, regulatory, or technical resources.

On 16 March 2011, the State Council announced that China had suspended the approval process for nuclear power stations to allow for the revision of safety standards - and to ensure no plants are built that fall short.

The majority of China's nuclear agenda was already split between two reactor models - the CPR1000, a homegrown "Generation II+" plant derived from French technology, and the AP1000, a "Generation III" plant from Westinghouse. There are other models as well - a smaller CNP600 (a Generation II reactor) and a Generation III French EPR model from AREVA, but these appear at only two locations.

There are a few obvious ways the ultimate decision (expected in August) could go, and some less obvious implications for each.

China's reactor fleet - two generations CPR1000: The CPR1000 is China's first modern reactor to be nearly 100-percent domestic in design. Closely derived from an AREVA design, it underwent dozens of improvements and is an object of national pride. Considered a "plus" above standard 2nd generation nuclear technology, the CPR1000 is fundamentally similar to the pressurized-water reactors presently in use throughout the world. AP1000: The AP1000 - part of the so-called third generation technology - appears to be the backbone of China's near-future nuclear fleet. Though a Westinghouse product, its tender was conditioned on significant technology transfer agreements, and will likely be iterated towards something China can build and sell itself in the future. The AP1000 is safer (in probabilistic terms) than the CPR1000, offering a range of "passive" safety features that help it operate longer in emergencies without human intervention.

In the first hypothetical scenario - i.e. if China determines that the CPR1000 meets whatever standards are decided on - the current slate of projects would progress as is currently projected, with about 21 CPR1000 reactors going up by 2015 across eight power station sites. Unaffected would also be the near-term fleet of AP1000s, with four reactors under construction at two sites.

Also in the pipeline, expected to come online around 2020, and unchanged with this scenario are five additional CPR1000 sites hosting seven extra reactors in total, and four new power stations with an extra 10 extra AP1000s (see Table 1 for a summary). CPR1000s and AP1000s make up the bulk of current plans, with a small number of other designs (EPR, HTR-PM, and BN800).

This is the basic roadmap that would bring China to roughly 40GW of nuclear generating capacity by 2015 and 80GW by 2020 - the levels implied by the 12^th Five Year Plan and most analyses.

Likely make up of China's nuclear expansion if Generation II is deemed to be adequate

Generation	Model	No. reactors by year (approx.)
		2015		2020
		Reactors	Sites	Reactors	Sites
II	CPR1000	21	8	7	5
	CNP600	3	2
	BN800			2	1
III	AP1000	4	2	10	4
	EPR	2	1
IV (research)	HTR-PM	1	1

In a second hypothetical scenario - i.e. if China determines it will go beyond the CPR1000 - these projects would likely be put on hold until more advanced reactors can be substituted for them.

An update in June 2011 on the World Nuclear Association's website noted that Westinghouse was in talks to deliver ten more AP1000s to China. Since the initial slate of AP1000s intended for the 2020 generation of projects was already public knowledge, this announcement could indicate that some CPR1000 projects may be on the chopping block - or it could indicate that additional AP1000s will be used in the future - or it could simply indicate that China intends to meet its current targets well ahead of schedule.

It's worth noting that ten AP1000s would not replace all the CPR1000s currently under construction. Does this imply that the AP1000 is preferred to the CPR1000, but that some projects are too far along to be replaced? It remains to be seen whether these projects will be cancelled or allowed to proceed if the second scenario eventuates.

Amidst all this uncertainty, however, one thing appears clear: the safety review may alter the mix of reactors used but will not change the scale of China's nuclear ambitions. According to Lin Boqiang, director of the Center for Chinese Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, "the suspension (of new project approvals) is just a temporary one and will not influence China's long term nuclear power construction plans".

The human element

A massive nuclear expansion necessitates an equally ambitious investment in human resources. So far, however, the capacity to train nuclear engineers, to regulate nuclear plants, and to build nuclear infrastructure remain unsettlingly similar to what it was in the era when China managed only a handful of civilian reactors.

Only four major universities offer nuclear engineering, and historically only a third of graduates have stayed in the field; China's booming industrial sector offered salary and prestige elsewhere. This is widely recognized as a problem, but changing attitudes toward careers in nuclear power - and then training students - takes time.

Moreover, a safe nuclear industry needs more than operators - it needs regulators and inspectors who are as expert on the technology as the operators, not to mention lawyers, economists, and policy analysts familiar enough with nuclear minutiae to bring light to issues outside day-to-day reactor operation.

China's National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) has received approval to increase in staff size, but the projected hiring levels would still leave the agency with fewer staff per reactor than for example the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Adequate training is another concern. And staffing aside, the NNSA is located lower in China's government hierarchy than the state-owned companies that manage the nuclear plants, potentially weakening its voice in high-level decisions on regulatory policy.

There are also signs that the pace of the nuclear build is beyond the capacity of China's nuclear construction companies (China Nuclear Engineering & Construction Group and China Nuclear Power Engineering Co). Traditional thermal plant construction companies have assisted on peripheral components of nuclear plants for some time, but in 2006 the NNSA granted licenses to 12 thermal power construction companies to install core nuclear components such as reactor pressure vessels. If this arrangement is maintained, especially in the context of stretched regulatory oversight and time pressure, it will be essential to ensure that these companies meet the high quality standards required for nuclear construction.

It appears that China's authorities are well aware of the challenges facing the country's proposed nuclear expansion. But many of the forces that must align in their favor, such as the desire of thousands of students and professionals to commit to the nuclear industry, are not in the government's entire control.

Whatever standards are adopted to help prevent another Fukushima, all involved must continue thinking creatively about how to build the multiplicity of institutions that support a safe nuclear industry. The recent Wenzhou rail tragedy is likely to shine a harsh light on the speed of development of large-scale projects, with some commentators already drawing parallels between high-speed rail and nuclear developments, as well as questioning whether China has "outpaced its ability to plan, operate and staff these complex undertakings in a safe and sustainable manner". It is imperative that no corners are cut in the construction and operation of nuclear hardware, as well as the development of the requisite human capacity.

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These figures have been collated from the World Nuclear Association's June 2011 update of nuclear power in China, using only data where an operation date was estimated: http://world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=320&terms=ap1000%20china, accessed 28 July 2011.

Ibid.

Buckley, C. (16 Mar 2011) "China freezes nuclear approvals after Japan crisis", Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-china-nuclear-idUSTRE72D1PN20110316, accessed 28 July 2011

Tu, K.J., & Livingstone, D. (29 July 2011) "Wenzhou crash shows the dangers of China's nuclear power ambitions", China Brief, 11: 14 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38239&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=517 , accessed 30 July 2011